

EXHIBIT NO. 124

SECRET

From: Washington (Hemura)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
Purple (CA)

#709 (Part 1 of 5)

At half past four the afternoon of the 18th, I had a private and secret interview with the President (the Secretary of State was present). The President, opening his remarks by saying that he had spent some few days enjoying life at sea, remarked that sailing was fine, and little fog had been encountered to mar the pleasure of the voyage. He went on to say that he sailed on his yacht, transferred to a warship, and then kept a rendezvous at a point off the Maine coast. Then, speaking as though there were many advocates of war, he took up the business of the interview and, holding notes in his hand, he said, "The Secretary of State, you, and I are continuing our efforts to bring about peace in the Pacific, but no one else is." I said, "There are many among the third powers who desire war in the Pacific." He affirmed this, and continued by saying, "The United States, Britain, and probably the Soviet too, hope for peace in the Pacific. But there are not many others who desire it."

21230

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/20/41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Womara)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941.
Purple (CA)

#709.

(Part 2 of 5)

After joking about "our German friend" who maintains no warships in the Pacific, the President said, "Neither you, the Secretary of State, nor I, have come up through the diplomatic ranks and, therefore, do not observe diplomatic conventions. What we have here is not in the form of a diplomatic document, nor is it in the form of an aide memoire but is merely what we want to say." Having said this, he read in a clear-cut, spirited manner the material which I incorporated into my #707^a and then said, "I have no desire to put these things in writing." Yet he seemed to be of the opinion that it should be expressed in writing.

Bearing in mind your instructions

a - Not available.

21231

Trans. 8-20-41 (1)

ARMY

SECRET

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SECRET

From: Washington (Mowura)
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
Purple (YO)

#709 (Part 3 of 5^a)

I expressed myself on the following points:

ITEM - The Japanese Government is sincere in its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japan-American diplomatic relations.

ITEM - The Japanese Government would like to be advised as to the possibility of arranging an interview with Prince KONO.

ITEM - The Japanese Government would like to be advised as to the possibility of informal conversations being realized in the near future along lines of conversations of the past few months.

ITEM - The Japanese Government, having already expressed its various opinions with regard to the French Indo-China question to the Secretary of State, feels that no additional explanations are necessary.

ITEM - The Japanese Government wishes to advise that Prince KONO is willing for an exchange of opinions along general lines from the viewpoint of world peace.

ITEM - The Japanese Government has every expectation that the finest statesmanship will be exercised by the United States Government. The Japanese Government will reciprocate in like manner.

I went on to say: "We have every confidence in your exemplary statesmanship and your ability to settle matters." The President listened closely to my remarks. Holding the Memoire outlined in my #708^b in his hand, he said: "Geographically speaking, it is impossible for me to go to

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ARMY

SECRET

Honolulu. I am not permitted to travel in an airplane."

a - For part 4 see S.I.S. #21176

B - Not available.

21232

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/20/41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 August 18, 1941.
 Purple. (CA) Urgent.

#709. (Part 4 of 5)^a

The President said: "The Japanese Prime Minister has (never?) been either to (this city?) nor to Seattle. How about Juneau? (It seems to me that he was once in Alaska (visiting?) Sitka^b, though I am not sure.) How many days would it take from Japan?"

I replied: "About ten days. I believe."

"How about the middle of .(?)?"

I replied: "I think it would be all right up until about that time."

Then he continued by saying: "For these reasons I have made a few changes in this paper." He then explained that it is merely for geographical reasons that he had stricken out the word "President" from the original text in which it was stated that the President himself would be present, and he read the paper to me. He added the remark: "It is not that I welcome the 'closed door' such as we have today, but, since we have been forced to it by Japan's actions, there is only one country that can open the door. This time it's Japan's turn." He changed his subject to that of French Indo China, stating that an official representing the Secretary of State was -----.

a - Parts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of 5 are not available.

b - District, Alaska, W. Coast of Baronef Island.

ARMY

21178

SECRET

Trans. 8-19-41 (3)

SECRET

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
August 18, 1941
Purple (CA)

709 (Part 5 of 5)

The President from beginning to end maintained an extremely tactful attitude and received me with kindness. (I got the impression that he was undoubtedly thrilled at the reception given by the British people to the joint British-American peace terms which he had succeeded in getting from CHURCHILL in his conversations with him during the past few days. (Unlike the independent declaration by the American Government in Wilson's Fourteen Points, this time, because of the insistence of the United States, joint peace terms by England and America were achieved.) In addition, some 14 or 15 days of life at sea, which he likes so well, have left him in the best of spirits.) Furthermore, the Secretary of State when we parted asked me to call any time that I so desired. The China question, being a separate problem, was not referred to at all in our conversations today.

During the course of our conversations, the President casually mentioned by name Postmaster General WALKER as being ardently endeavoring to bring about Japanese-American good will and, with regard to the early realization of the suggested interview, it seems that he had spoken in its favor.

With regard to our conversations of this day, I shall make a full report of my humble opinions separately.

21233

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/20/41 (1)

From: Washington (Nomura).
 To : Tokyo.
 19 August 1941
 (Purple)

#719 (in 2 parts, complete).

The fact that upon his return to the capital on Sunday, the President wished to see me before any other person, with the exception of the Secretary of State with whom he talked for several hours, clearly indicates the graveness with which he views Japanese-U.S. relations. It is apparent that the note contained in my message #707* was prepared in advance of the President's return. I have already reported that while reading the note, the President interrupted himself on several occasions to make minor and major comments thereon.

The note with I relayed to you as my message #708**, on the other hand, seemed to contain much that was the President's own attitude and opinion. From that, it seems as if the President was inclined to be in favor of our proposal on certain conditions.

However, when I said that the matter depended entirely on the President's statesmanship, he replied that the United States was not in favor of the "closed door" and that it was Japan's turn to figure out ways and means of opening it.

The impression I got throughout my talks with him was that he harbored other desires. There is no room for doubt, however, that the President hopes that matters will take a turn for the better.

According to recent comments in the newspapers, the President is fearful of the dangers of the United States being drawn into a war in the Far East. Apparently, he believes that there is a 50-50 chance that Japan will attempt further aggression.

It is true that by our proposing that talks be held between the leaders of the two countries, the attitude of the U.S. Government has been considerably eased. However, it is of the utmost importance that this matter be kept strictly secret for if it should once leak out, attempts will be made from every direction to destroy the project. I feel above all else that it is essential that a strict secrecy be maintained in Japan, also.

We, too, are giving this matter our careful attention and study, and should we stumble on to some good

JD-1: 12

(continued) (L) Navy Trans. 8-22-41 (2)

ideas, we shall report them to you for whatever value they may have.

*JD-1: 4672.

**JD-1: 4696 and 4713.

21242

JD-1:

(D) N v. H. 8-22-41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: . Tokyo
August 20, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

#722.

(Part 1 of 2)

During my conversation with a member of the Cabinet, he remarked, "The President has a broad-minded view of the world and is not anti-Japanese. In his past speeches and in his recent statement he has never referred to Japan. As soon as he returned to Washington he had the Secretary of State take up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conference and replied to you. This is an unprecedented thing and it seems that Japan should reciprocate in a like manner." So I replied by saying that it was with a strong resolution that the Japanese Government had come thus far in dealing with this question; whereupon the Cabinet member replied, "It is equally true in the case of the President. Above all, even if there is no real justification for it, the country is replete with anti-Japanese sentiment."

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Trans. 8-21-41 (7)

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

From Washington (amura),
to Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (3A)

722 (Part 2 of 2)

"and when the atmosphere in Congress is just as bad, if
is fact leaks out there is no doubt that a strong opposition will be
made, but if the conference succeeds and as a result peace is maintained
in the Pacific, the people will for the first time ----- since
I myself had endeavored in the same direction, the success would make
me feel that life is worth living. Inasmuch as there is no way of tell-
ing whether the President will continue to take such an open-hearted
attitude in the future, I earnestly wish that a way could be found to
successfully settle this question."

21274

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/21/41 (7)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nemura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#723. Part 1 of 2.

It seems that the President believes that he could meet with Premier KONOYE depending on circumstances (my #722^a). It is not hard to imagine that he is also of the opinion that he would like to take this matter out of the hands of the authorities and settle it himself because of the general situation. It may be said that the President had made this proposal so that he could make his last political stroke at this moment when Japanese-American feelings are at their worst. It is well for Japan to respond in a like generous spirit to this move on the part of the President. It would be well also to leave the decisions of the concrete points until some future date - - - - - and show that there is nothing that would conflict with - - - - - and I think it is imperative that we thus bring about the resumption of the informal negotiations which have been disrupted.

From this standpoint, I am submitting a proposal we have drawn up (- - - #724^a). There may be points in it that need to be dealt with more in detail. Should I think of any points that should be added I will wire them later. This

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proposal gives due respect to the policy proposed by the United States Government.

a - See S.I.S. #21273 and #21274.

b - See S.I.S. #21350 to #21356 inclusive - text of Nomura's proposal.

Trans. 8/25/41 (X) -

ARMY

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SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#723. Part 2 of 2.

It explains the immutable policy of our government based on the important statements by Prime Minister KONOYE and Ministers HIRANUMA, ARITA and MATSUOKA and attempts to correct misunderstandings regarding this policy. I believe that since it is limited to those points included in the American proposal, it would be accepted as a sufficient statement and is within the possibility of the United States giving it careful consideration. Of course, it is not wise to refer to those points which the President had not taken up. This is only a convenient method for opening Japanese-American negotiations and is not of a nature that could be proclaimed to the world as Japan's national policy.

I would like to have this proposal considered by the Foreign Office bearing in mind the points I have mentioned above. If the Japanese Government is determined to adjust Japanese-American relations, this is the time. Losing this opportunity, there will be no other that we can take. If the meeting is to take place about the middle of September, as the President has suggested, there is left for preliminary negotiations less than two months, in fact a little more than a month. Besides, if the meeting is really to take place, it would be necessary to

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have a ship ready and to select those who will accompany the
part. For these reasons I urge that you decide on this
matter quickly.

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trans. 8/25/41 (X)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

1724. (Part 1 of 7)

To be handled in Government Code.

Strictly confidential.

Reference is made to the communication conveyed, on August 17th, 1941, to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State and the President of the United States.

The Government of the United States mentions certain circumstances and measures considered as inimical to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of world crisis and international cohesion, it is difficult to ascertain whether an event is a cause or a consequence.

Accordingly, not unlike the press in Japan, much news and editorial comment in the United States has forecasted the "encirclement" of Japan as the outcome of American-British policy in the Far East. Exaggerated specifications have been made by the press to indicate how, with the assistance of Russia, Japan would be deprived of natural resources and opportunity in the East Asia region. Meanwhile, the United States had taken certain measures which could be interpreted in Japan as indicative of a continuing unfriendly pressure at variance with our then current amicable conversations.

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Trans. 1-22-41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 22, 1941.
Purple. (English text)

724. (Part 2 of 7)

The Government of the United States considers that certain of its actions vis-a-vis Japan have been only counter-measures to policies and procedures prejudicial to American interests and principles. On the other hand, the Government of Japan considers that its own actions have been dictated by considerations responsive to hazards, circumstantial and political, affecting the national sufficiency and protection of Japan.

It is quite conceivable that both Governments are right.

With admirable modesty of mind, the Government of the United States has seemed, frequently, unaware that the words of policy are weighted with the immense power of America's natural endowment and potential might. The President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, in their own unquestioning adherence to the way of peaceful procedures, might find it difficult to believe that other nationals, anywhere, could consider themselves threatened by the United States.

Yet, so long as they lack that assuagement of possible threat (so convincingly eliminated from South America by the good neighbor policy) there will be some, geographically less well endowed and, by nature, poor in essential resources, who will feel compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

Trans. 8-22-41 (2)

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Plain Text)

#724

(Part 3 of 7)

It is not, therefore, surprising that temporary measures taken by the Government of Japan for the protection of its own equitable and necessary supply of living commodities, should be interpreted, though never so intended nor operated, prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials.

Equally, it is not surprising that, lacking such guarantees as are mentioned in the communication of August 17th, and in default of a consummated understanding with the United States, the Government of Japan felt compelled by current conditions to take certain measures of precautionary defense.

Accordingly, the Government of Japan appreciates that, having indicated difficulties, the Government of the United States now encourages an exchange of basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area.

For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation--the Government of Japan would be proud to make sacrifices.

ARMY

21352

SECRET

Trans. 8/22/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Text)

724 (To be handled in government code.) Part 4 of 7.

The government of Japan, with lively appreciation, endorses as its own, without qualification, the slogan "program attainable by peaceful methods". As outlined in the communication of August 17, 1941, the program is such as has long been desired and sought by Japan.

The government of Japan desires, for itself and all others, the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. The government of Japan desires to make possible for itself and all countries, access to raw materials and to all of her essential commodities. The government of Japan desires cooperation by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary and peaceful basis, for the utilization of available resources of capital, technical skillfull, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own but also the economy of regions where the productive and distributive capacities can be improved, in such manner that for the nations and peoples concerned, purchasing power will be increased, living standards raised and conditions conducive to peace will be created.

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SECRET

Trans. 8/22/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Text)

#724

(Part 5 of 7)

(To be handled in Government Code)

If such a program, based upon peaceful and constructive principles, is adopted for the Pacific and if, thereafter, any of the countries or areas in the Pacific were menaced, the Government of Japan would cooperate with the other nations in extending assistance to any nation so threatened. The Government of Japan believes that such a program if faithfully carried out, with the consideration for the relative conditions of the various nations, would preclude the extension, by any one country, of political or military control to attain economic right of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character. In those cases where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, it is expected that the Government of the United States will use its great influence to see that all countries are given fair and guaranteed share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies, and at a fair price.

Moreover, the Government of Japan rejects any intention of territorial aggrandizement or exploitation of other peoples. It desires the orderly establishment of effective, responsible, independent sovereignty in a united China. It desires the political inviolability of all Pacific nations.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/21/41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Memara)
 To: Tokyo
 August 20, 1941.
 Purple.

#724. To be handled in Government Code.

(Part 6 of 7)

The Government of Japan does not desire, unless forced thereto by political or economic aggression, that the East Asian region should be cut away from a world economy of equitable and peaceful processes, but it does desire that the principles of non-discrimination should be operative and exercised by other nations, no less than by Japan, for both citizenry and commerce. The Government of Japan has sought to express, in its international procedures, the cultural and ethical ideals of peace and harmony which are part of Japanese national culture. Japan participated in the League of Nations and cooperated in various disarmament conferences. But multiple events of world turmoil — of discrimination — of boycott and barriers — of personal indignities and attack, motivated the Governments, responsible for the welfare of the Japanese people, to take certain counter measures which they would have preferred to avoid. Some of these measures, whether faction or alliances, were interpreted as aggressive.

The Government of Japan has no intention and no alliances and no policy of aggression. The Government of Japan conceives its people as members of the family of nations, each of whom ought to live, and let live, under the common bond of brotherhood and just tolerance.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. -22-41 (2)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
Purple (English Plain Text) Urgent

#724

(Part 7 of 7)

We consider that the natural position and circumstances of Japan and her people is not incomparable to that of Britain; and the deprivation of economic opportunity by boycott and discrimination are measures against which, not less than against military attack, the precepts of national security and honor require resistance. It is this policy of resistance, extended to armed conflict, that has been interpreted by some as aggressive.

But, the Government of Japan prefers a policy of cooperation and desires to sincerely respond to the cordial, penetrating proposals of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State by the rapid conclusion of our informally negotiated, and almost completed, understanding. The meeting of the responsible head of our respective Governments would confirm and give such sanction to our purposes that peace in the Pacific would be insisted with the date of that meeting.

It is with great good will that the Government of Japan anticipates the complete resumption of the historic friendship with the United States.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/22/41 (2)

From: Tokyo.
 To : Washington.
 21 August 1941
 (Purple-CA)

?

- - - (Preamble and first couple of lines missed).

- - - in view of this request (the said Ambassador notified me, also, on the 15th), I had the various circles concerned make investigations, I said. I went on to say that we are trying to dispose of the matter in accordance with the desires expressed by the United States and that I was certain that I would be able to submit a reply to him at an early opportunity.

Then, on condition that he keep it strictly confidential and "off the record" I talked to him for over two hours concerning the matter contained in my message #452*. I pointed out to him, in accordance with the lines contained in my previous messages, the absolute necessity of displaying some real statesmanship if we are to surmount the crisis which now confronts us.

So saying, I strongly urged that the proposed talks take place. I added that since he had worked so tirelessly during the past nine years in behalf of Japanese-U.S. friendship, I was counting on his services in the promotion of these talks.

The above is for your information.

JD-1: 4380. Amb. Nomura is directed to fuel out the attitude of U.S. officials on arranging a meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Prince Konoe for a friendly discussion of steps that may be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.

4c

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-22-41 (J-TT)

From: Washington.
 To : Tokyo.
 21 August 1941
 (Purple-CA)

#725

According to reports along the lines of those contained in my #722*, there are indications that the President himself is becoming seriously interested in participating in the resumption of the negotiations to revise Japanese-U.S. relations. It is even said that the latter half of the note which I sent to you as my message #708**, was composed by the President himself. I have also heard that he expects to have me hand our reply to that note directly to him. For these reasons, I believe that it would be well if we omitted all of the involved and complicated points in the composition of our reply and instead gave it in the most simple and direct phraseology as possible. In my opinion, I think it would be to our interest if we omitted expressions like "continuance of encirclement" as it appears in section three of my message #724***. Other corrections which I would make would include the changing of the phrase "of discrimination, of boycott, and barriers, of personal integrities and attack" as it appears in section 18, to, simply, "circumstances in the recent pact". I also feel that it is essential that we point out the fact that we place much emphasis on the point concerning the guaranteeing of the safety of the Far East.

*JD-1: 4695. Nomura reports the gist of a conversation with a Cabinet member in which he is told of President Roosevelt's interest in the proposed conference (with Konoye) and of his (the Cabinet member's) hope for its success.

**JD-1: 4696. Text of memorandum handed to b. Nomura by the President.

***JD-1: 4735. Text of b. Nomura's (proposed) reply to the President's note.

21460

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-25-41 (2)

From: Tokyo.
 To : Washington.
 23 August 1941
 (Purple-CA)

#495

(Strictly Confidential)

According to newspaper reports, it is alleged that a British-U.S.-Soviet conference will be held early in September. This comes at the same time as the reports that the United States is shipping goods to aid the Soviet Union, which in many respects confirms the already existing rumors of "encirclement". Under these circumstances, if the proposed talks between the leaders of Japan and the United States comes subsequent to the above referred to tripartite conference, the general impression would be that Japan had given in in the face of the threat of "encirclement".

We are, therefore, doing everything in our power to rush our reply to the United States and at the same time to bring about the "leaders conference" at an earlier date. Under these circumstances, will you please exert as much effort as possible to accomplish this. At the same time will you please draw the United States' attention again to the matter contained in the last part of my message #487.*

*JD-1: 4694. Tokyo's intentions regarding her northern policy are outlined to A. b. Nomura for his information, with the request that should the U.S. question the increase of Jap troops in the North, it should be explained as a precautionary measure taken to offset dangers that might arise from a Soviet defeat and subsequent political confusion in Eastern Russia. Also, that should the U.S. ship vital materials to Russia via Japanese coastal waters, it would provoke the feelings of the Japanese people and have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting U.S.-Japanese relations.

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-25-41 (S-TT)

From: Washington.
 To : Tokyo.
 23 August 1941
 (Purple-CA)

#739

I called on Secretary Hull again at 5 o'clock this (Saturday) afternoon, and in accordance with the contents of your message #425 (?)*, reported that Japan was prepared to make an early reply and at the same time to hold the "leader's conference" at an earlier date than previously proposed. As you instructed, I requested that the Moscow conference be delayed and the proposed material aid to the Soviet Union be withheld for the time being.

The Secretary made no comment with regard to the first part. With regard to the second portion of my statement, he again - as he did this morning - pointed to the Japanese-U.S.S.R. Neutrality Pact.

He did assure me, however, that my statement would be relayed to the President. According to reports - - - - - the President has made inquiries as to whether Japan's reply had arrived or not. In my opinion, the President is the one who shows the most interest in the "leader's conference".

*JD-1: 4769. Tokyo wires Washington that every effort is being made to rush a reply to the President's note, etc., etc.

2146J

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-26-41 (2)

From: Washington.
To : Tokyo.
25 August 1941
(Purple)

Unnumbered

To Chief of Telegraph Section, from
Iguchi*.

We are expecting your reply concerning
revisions in U.S.-Japanese relations within a very few days.
Will you please insert the one word "SAKURA" in plain language
at the beginning of that message when it is dispatched so that
we may decode it without loss of time.

Sadao Iguchi - Counselor.

2158.

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-28-41 (1)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple CA (Very Urgent)

#501

Re your #707^a and 708^a.

This is a matter of great gravity and the Premier is eager concerning these conversations. Therefore, I am wiring you under this date, message #502 containing a message from the Premier to the President and in #503 the reply of the Imperial Government, (in which connection see also #504.)

Will you please go and report them immediately to both the President and the Secretary of State.

a - For 707 see S.I.S. #21226 and for 708 see S.I.S. #21334 & #21339 which are the texts of two notes handed ambassador Nomura by President Roosevelt.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/26/41 ()

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 28, 1941
Purple (Very urgent)

#502 (Part 1 of 2) (To be handled in Government Code)

I am very much pleased to learn from the document which you handed to Ambassador NOMURA on August 17 that you are in agreement with the idea contained in our proposal regarding holding a meeting between you and me.

Today, when the whole world is in confusion, for the two countries of Japan and the United States, who hold the key to world peace, to drift as we are drifting toward the worst of relations, not only is an unfortunate thing in itself but also means the downfall of world civilization. The reason for Japan being so concerned over the question of peace in the Pacific lies in no other than her desire not only to improve the relations between Japan and the United States, but also to contribute to the realization of world peace through the opportunity which such improved relations would afford.

It seems to me the reason that Japanese-American relations have come to be so bad as they are today is to be found largely in the fact that the governments of the two countries have been lacking in mutual understanding and have repeatedly doubted and misconstrued each other's intentions. It seems also to have been due to machinations on the part of third-power countries. Unless we begin with the elimination of such causes, we cannot by any means hope that the relations between the two countries could be adjusted. Herein lies the reason for my proposing that I meet you face to face for the purpose of frankly exchanging our views.

ARMY

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Trans. 8/26/41 (5)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)

#502

(Part 2 of 2)

however, the method upon which we have hitherto been replying, namely, the method of informal negotiations, which was disrupted in July-- though it may have been, on the whole, appropriate in consideration of the attitude then taken and of the matters discussed--even if continued from now on with a view of having the leaders of the two governments later giving recognition to the matters discussed, is not a suitable method under the present circumstances in which rapid changes are taking place and the possibility of an unfortunate condition arising is unforeseeable. I believe the need of the moment is for the leaders of the two countries to meet face to face and to discuss whether there is any possibility of saving the present situation by studying together with a proper perspective the important questions which affect the whole area of the Pacific Ocean lying between the two countries, and to do this without being bound by the customary method of negotiations. It would be all right to have the details settled by those officials specializing in such matters according as the necessity arises after the leaders have conferred on them.

This is the idea underlying my proposal. It is my earnest wish that you would accept this proposal in an understanding spirit and reciprocate. The situation being such as explained above, I am eagerly

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ARMY

SECRET

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waiting for the day of our meeting. As to the place of the meeting, I believe that, in view of various circumstances, it would be best if it were somewhere in the vicinity of Hawaii.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/26/41 (S)

SECRET
EX-100
100-100

(Part 1 of 7) (To be included in Government Code)

The Imperial Government has received the communication
sent and given to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on August 17,
1941, and sets forth its viewpoint as follows:

The Government of the United States, realizing that the
economic resources which Japan took in French Indo-China were destroyed
as one of the main aims which the conference having to do with settlement
of possible areas of problems affecting the Pacific area should be estab-
lished, wishes that the Japanese Government would abandon the imperi-
alist attitude, adjust its attitude, and work toward the program
of peace in the Pacific, in accordance with the principles embodied in
the program which the United States upholds. At the same time, the
United States Government wishes that the Japanese Government would aban-
don a former attitude that there is no restriction regarding Japan's
military activities and plans. Furthermore, the United States Government
has definitely stated the fact that it will resort at once to every
method it deems necessary should Japan take any further steps in line
with the policy of arbitrarily demanding Japan's neighboring countries
by means of force or by means which are in the nature of a threat by
force.

(This is paraphrasing this above document.)

2147

SECRET

Trans. 3/24/41 (15)

SECRET

From Tokyo
To Washington
August 28, 1941
Priority

290 (Part 2 of 3) (To be handled in American code.)

The Government of Japan must hold its feet deeply responsible
for having Japan's past wrongs and her repeated unprovoked aggression
her aggressions and unprovoked attacks against the United States
which is still suffering from uncertainty and fear. The Government of the
United States refers to certain situations and conditions which it considers
harmful to the peaceful settlement of problems affecting the Pacific area
and does so in the best safety of the fundamental principles to which it
has pledged itself. However, it is not a world which as we have seen and to
such an atmosphere of international relations, it is completely sufficient
to judge whether a certain incident is the cause or the result. It is,
furthermore, dangerous to base that judgment exclusively upon certain published
facts only. The Government of Japan must hold peace and its interest and a
judgment is to lasting peace.

When a country's natural and peaceful progress is interrupted
with or when its right of existence is threatened from without, the
country to take measures to cope with the threat or to resort to action for
its defence not only is inevitable, but also must be said to be a most
natural thing from the standpoint of maintaining peace. Therefore, when
criticizing such counter-measures or alternative actions, to maintain the
peace and to correct the situation must be regarded as the greatest basis
for a speedy establishment of peace.

REF ID: A621475

SECRET August 28, 1941


SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple

(Part 3 of 7)

We shall not consider at this time those things which have happened in the far past. However, if the matter is regarded in the light of recent incidents, we find that many newspaper articles and editorials in the United States have predicted that a British-American joint policy in the Far East would result in a threat to Japan and have hinted the formation of an anti-Japanese front by Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands Indies. In the meantime, in conflict with the friendly cooperations that were taking place at the time between Japan and the United States, the United States Government has expressed its intention of applying a continuous and unfriendly policy of pressure and has taken measures which might deprive Japan of the opportunity of obtaining the natural resources necessary to Japan. Although the United States considered some measures as having been taken in opposition to Japan's policy and activities which the United States considered as harmful to her rights and to the principles she upheld, on the other hand, the Japanese Government believed that her actions were governed by similar motives which she had taken to cope with circumstances and political conditions which affected her national requirements of raw materials and energy.

It should not be forgotten that, in general, what the Government of the United States has done since the beginning of the war has been to support the Japanese cause against the United States, and that in some instances it has done so in a manner which has been very effective. It should also be noted that the Japanese Government has been very active in the Far East since the beginning of the war, and that it has been very successful in its operations in that region.



SECRET

100-100000
Washington
D. C.

(Part 4 of 7) (To be handled in Government circles.)

Because of the fact that the President of the United States
 and his Secretary of State have a firm conviction in general terms,
 it may be difficult for them to believe that the people in other countries
 would not feel that they are threatened by the United States. It should be
 clearly understood in that that as long as this subject threat is not
 removed, the people in the countries which are less directly affected than the
 United States (especially because of the scarcity of resources) must
 have the proper perspective with the United States in a defensive
 way. One believes that in everything practical diplomacy can be obtained
 only by really understanding the position and the circumstances which affect
 the others, rather than by calculating the individual acts of the others.
 From this standpoint, the Government of Japan is pleased with the fact
 that the United States encourages the exchange of opinions regarding the
 policy and attitude which must form the basis of the understanding which
 is essential to a lasting and broad peace in the Pacific area.

21477

SECRET

4/24/50 (H)

0120

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 August 15, 1941
 Subject:

J008

(Part 8 of 7)

The steps which Japan has taken for the past several years in the Far East, as stated repeatedly in the past, had for their purpose hastening of the establishment of the China Incident zone. They originated from the threat against Japan's right of self-defense. They constituted also a policy which became, for reasons of self-defense, inevitable for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Far East by coying with various threats which would be through the years, and thereby to achieve an equitable supply of materials and commodities to the country. It was not the nature of merely posing a threat. Therefore, should the China Incident be settled or should a just peace be established in the Far East, the Government of Japan, as you already know, is willing to withdraw its troops immediately from China. In order that every bit of possible doubt may be removed, the Government of Japan reiterates here the statement she has repeated in the past—that her steps with regard to the China Incident of recent years were not taken with the intention of posing, that is, a policy which to advance by force into the continental area. Through the statements made above, we believe that Japan's attitude toward China is self-evident. Also, as regards Japanese-Chinese relations, the Japanese Government is to state clearly here that as long as the world's peace respects the terms of the Russo-Japanese Commercial Agreement and abstains from taking actions which are a threat to Japan's self-defense or are a contravention to the spirit of this agreement, Japan will not resort to

21478

SECRET

SECRET

military action against that country. It is, therefore, an earnest desire on the part of the Japanese Government that the United States Government refrain from any action that would instill fear in the Japanese, or any nothing of the people in those countries which might be a threat by the United States and Soviet-Russia acting jointly.

SECRET

From Tokyo
To Washington
August 22, 1941
Purple

4007 (Part 6 of 7) (To be handled as Government code.)

In order that we might do this, the Imperial Government is not inclined to exercise force toward the various countries adjacent to her.

The Government of the United States has gone so far as having said that these historical differences between the Government of Japan and the United States have for long years the character of those for negotiations having to do with bringing about a possible settlement in the entire Pacific area as a matter of drafting a program which will include mutual peaceful measures. In this respect the Government of Japan is wholeheartedly in accord. Furthermore, the Government of the United States has made it clear that she will give no assistance to any country except those having to do with one of the rights and prerogatives of other Japan or of the United States, or otherwise with the principles which have been observed by the United States in the past. This attitude is entirely equally in the principle which the Government of Japan has observed in its fundamental national policy.

The Imperial Japanese Government believes that the Government of the United States understands that the program having to do with mutual peaceful measures will not be a program which will be undertaken by one of the two countries, but that it will be undertaken by both of them in a mutual and friendly manner.

SECRET

enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries economically, politically, militarily, from the point of view of natural resources or geographically shall assume an attitude of strict impartiality with regard to cooperation and to the distribution of such advantages. It is natural and essential that, first of all, satisfying the requirements essential to the existence of a country, in a spirit of reciprocity agreements should be made in relation to the areas adjacent to it. It is furthermore important in hastening the establishment of peace.

21479

ARMY H. I.

SECRET

SECRET

From: Navy
To: Washington
August 28, 1941
Priority

8500

(Part 7 of 7)

to be handled in government code.

I believe that the opinions of the Imperial Government as set forth above are clear and concise. We believe that it is paramount for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific that the governments of Japan and the United States confer dispassionately and constructively together on problems great and small.

From this point of view it is my fervent belief that it would be highly significant for the leaders of both countries to meet together for an immediate conference. However, in order that such a conference can be conducted in the most friendly manner, I believe that it is essential to immediately quiet the impression that this step is due to pressure put upon the Japanese Government by the Government of the United States. The Japanese Government is convinced that the Government of the United States is in the main interested in the establishment of world peace and Japan has decided to reciprocate and in the light of the present international situation has decided to endorse the early investigation of this conference.

21480

SECRET

SECRET

Trans. 8/26/41 (8)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 29, 1941
Purple (CA)

#609

(Part 1 of 3)

Re my #503 .

(A) For convenience's sake, in exchanging messages in the future on this question, please insert the paragraph numbers in the order used in the caption telegram.

1. (The section beginning "The Government of the United States" and repeating the content of recently received documents)

2. (The section beginning "The Government of Japan cannot help but feel deeply regrettable that despite Japan's past pledges, etc.")

3. (The section beginning "The steps which Japan has taken for the joint defense of French Indo-China, etc.")

4. (The section beginning "The Government of the United States has gone on record as having said that, etc.")

5. (The section beginning "The Imperial Japanese Government believes that the Government of the United States considers, etc.")

6. (The section beginning "I believe that the opinions of the Imperial Government as set forth above, etc.")

(B) The following are explanations of the points in the caption telegram which need special attention:

(1) Our opinions regarding this question were set forth briefly in response to those views which the United States Government freely submitted with the request that we do likewise.

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

We made our views clear, believing that by so doing we might find in due time points upon which the two parties can agree in a friendly spirit and that because of this the meeting of the leaders of the two countries would prove to be effective.

a - S.I.S. Nos. 21474-80 which give Japan's viewpoints with regard to American-Japanese negotiations.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/20/41 (5)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 August 28, 1941
 Purple (CA)

509

(Part 2 of 3)

(2) With regard to Part 3^a, "should a just peace be established in the Far East." This means, for example, when the CHIANG regime has become merely a local regime as a result of the closing of routes used to aid that regime; when Japanese-Chinese relations have, on the whole, actually returned to normalcy; and when it is possible to secure efficiently and justly materials from French Indo-China, Japan will be willing to consider withdrawing her troops even if a complete settlement of the China incident has not been achieved. In other words, it was a statement made because of the desire to allow as much flexibility as possible when the conversations are to be begun.

(3) With regard to Part 5. (A)^a. "... which will be applicable to the whole world, etc." was inserted out of consideration of the fact that if the principles and desires expressed by the other side are applied merely within the Pacific area, we would suffer various restrictions within the East Asia sphere of co-prosperity in which we hope to establish a new order, while the United States, on the other hand, would not be bound by any pledge with regard to her relations with her adjacent areas. Since this would result in an arrangement which would be one-sided insofar as it affects Japan, I thought that the principle should be such as may be applied to the entire world.

a - The parts referred to do not correspond to parts in the translated message; Part 3 mentioned above corresponds to Part 5 in the translated message, and Part 5 to Part 6.

ARMY

011

SECRET

Trans. 8/28/41 (S)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 28, 1941
Purple (CA)

#509 (Part 3 of 3.)

(B) With regard to that section in which it is stated that countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries should assume an attitude of strict impartiality with regard to cooperation and to the distribution of such advantages, we wish to point out the logical reasons for cooperation in the application of leadership to the end of bringing about steps for an equitable distribution of resources by those countries who are advantageously situated, and the passage has to do with the proposal by the United States with reference to equality of economic opportunity and treatment. In other words, it hints the idea that it is natural that Japan should assume peaceful economic leadership within the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity.

(C) As to the words to the effect that it is natural and essential that adjustments should be made in a spirit of reciprocity in relation to the areas adjacent, etc., the passage clarifies the fact that Japan is inevitably, as well as naturally, endeavoring to bring about peace on the basis of the principle of equality in her relation with Manchukuo and China; that is to say, on the basis of the principle of good neighborliness to the end of establishing the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity. It also goes to show that the

Page 1.

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

policy of adjacent countries each respecting the conditions peculiar to the other, is not a policy, as the United States alleges it to be, of securing a position superior to the others. This has many points in common with the American Monroe policy.

The passage in which appear the words "first of all satisfying the requirements essential to the existence of a country" came from the idea of so-called (joint defense ?) which the United States Government referred to. This passage was given with the idea also of a joint defense in China in our mind.

In other words, (A), (B) and (C) were brought out as a precaution against the possibility of our being too narrowly restricted when the discussion takes place concerning the method by which the East Asia sphere of co-prosperity should be established.

ARMY

SECRET Trans. 8/28/41 (1)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 August 28, 1941
 Purple CA (Very Urgent)

#752

(Part 1 of 2)^cRe my #748^a.

Today, the 28th, at 11:00 a.m. in accordance with your instructions, I had an interview with the President (the Secretary of State was present.) I gave him at that time your message as well as the English text of your #503^b. While the President was reading the message he flatteringly commended it. Having read it thoroughly, in discussing the point having to do with discrimination he smilingly and cynically said, "Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince KONOYE, I wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those conversations just as an invasion of French-Indo China occurred during Secretary HULL'S conversations with your Excellency." However, I could see that he was well pleased. He continued by saying, "I am looking forward to having approximately three days talk with Prince KONOYE. The main thing that I am interested in is the saving of time. Hawaii is out of the question for according to the constitution the President must sign bills passed through the Houses of Congress within ten days and I cannot have the Vice-president do it for me."

a - Not available.

b - S.I.S.#21474-80 inclusive, English text message containing statement to be made to Roosevelt.

Trans. 8/30/41 (2)

ARMY

SECRET

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 28, 1941
Purple (CA)

752

(Part 2 of 2)^R

He explained that in this respect it is different with the Japanese Government in that the Japanese Government could appoint an acting minister and added that if it is going to be in Juneau, it would take three days to Seattle, and the round trip from that point on being ten days, if we had fourteen days in all, we would be able to do it, but it would be impossible if it is going to be in Hawaii, since it would take three weeks. I, therefore, told him that insofar as the Japanese Government is concerned, their chief object is to hold a conference, and question of the place of the conference is secondary. I promised that I would communicate the details to the government. I then said that we would like to have the earliest possible date set, whereupon the President replied that he did not object to having an early date set, but he did not give the immediate reply as to when.

The President added also that the recent meeting with CHURCHILL was to have taken place in ----- this year but had been postponed on account of the Balkan War and that the meeting was held after the Congress had approved of it. The conversation between the President and me was as given above. These conversations will be continued.

a - Part 1 of 2 not available.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/29/41 (7)

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 28, 1941
Purple (CA)

. 753

Re my ^a 752 .

Since the time for the interview was announced by the White House, the Secretary of State immediately made public briefly the fact that I had delivered to him after the conference Premier HONOKU's message to the President, which was discussed by us. It was agreed that no reference should be made to the content of the message.

a - part 2 of 2 available, being translated.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/29/41 (7)

From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
29 August 1941
(Purple-CA)

#510

As you have been advised by other messages concerning this matter, no information of the "leaders' conference" should be allowed to leak out until it is definitely settled upon. You should be perfectly well aware that such leaks may make it impossible to get some things done which otherwise would be well within the realm of possibility.

On the 28th, however, the Domei and other press dispatches, report that in an interview to the press you made references to Premier Konoye's message. (We suppressed those dispatches here). Hereafter will you please refrain from making any mention of this until you have communicated with this office.

Although we were able to suppress the above mentioned dispatches, in view of the channel through which they arrived, we are of the opinion that a fairly large group of people are now aware of the news. We are at present figuring out ways and means of making the best of the situation. In the meantime, will you take every precaution against any leakage of the contents of the message.

JD-1:

4853

(D) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (J-TT)

From: Tokyo.
 To : Washington.
 29 August 1941
 (Purple-CA)

#511

Regarding my message #510*

In view of our domestic situation and the delicate international situation, we had intended to keep this matter a strict secret for the time being. However, now that the matter has been made public in your area, we fear that there will be further misunderstanding if we should attempt to suppress or censor the news here. Being of the opinion that it would be best to publicly announce the contents of section 2 of paragraph 5 of the separate message, we did so at 2:30 p.m. on the 29th.

It should be superfluous to mention that because we must take into consideration our relations with Germany and Italy, and in view of the exceedingly complex domestic situation, there is such danger that the project will fail if information is allowed to leak out before a settlement is reached. Bear this in mind and take every precaution to guard against leaks. You should conduct your negotiations, as they were being conducted during your unofficial talks, in such a manner so as to avoid attracting any attention. (We do not feel that the contents of the discussion on the 28th should be made public at this time). Hereafter, will you please get in touch before you make any public statements. We realize, of course, that you may let an opportunity slip by by this delay, but please look upon such an occurrence as being unavoidable under the present circumstances.

With regard to the location at which the "Leaders' conference" should take place, we mentioned Hawaii after giving consideration to our dignity and also because early in the discussions the United States suggested Hawaii.

We do not insist upon Hawaii, but if it is not to take place there, we feel that we should avoid selecting a place which is a part of either nation, but select a spot on the high seas. Please discuss this matter along those lines.

With regard to maintenance of security, in view of the matter contained in your message #754**, will you please request the Germans to cooperate fully. (You are aware that our relations with Germany and Italy may be unfavorably affected by announcements made in the United States. It is quite possible that the United States proposed that the announcement be made to estrange Japan from Germany and Italy. We expect to have

JD-1:

(continued) (J) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)

* 4863

~~XXXXX~~

at least this muc. cooperation from them).

With regard to the announcement made by us which was mentioned early in this message, we felt that time was of the utmost importance; we could not consult the C.S. first. Please explain this to them.

JD-1: 4868

**Not available.

21647

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)

From : [unclear] ton.
To : Tokyo.
27 April 1941
(20-10-01)

756 (20-10-01 - parts 1, 2, 3 translated 9-9-41)

4. I assume that Prince Konoye will
travel to Washington and that about ten days will be required en route.

5. The public statement will be made
jointly by the two agreed upon by both. I believe that the best
time will be shortly after Prince Konoye's departure.

The Secretary of State agrees to dis-
cuss these points with the President. In general, it may be said
that the Secretary of State is an exceedingly cautious person.
There are indications that he is considering this matter from many
angles. I feel that unless we are in fairly close agreement the
"Leaders' conference" will not materialize.